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COMMENT 
DANGER IN THE DMCA SAFE HARBORS: THE NEED 
TO NARROW WHAT CONSTITUTES RED FLAG 
KNOWLEDGE 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1998 Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act ("DMCA") in order to "provide certainty for copyright owners 
and Internet service providers with respect to copyright in-
fringement liability online."1 The DMCA safe harbors protect In-
ternet and online service providers such as YouTube from sec-
ondary copyright infringement liability. 2 The DMCA, however, 
does not provide full protection as certain caveats greatly reduce 
the safe harbor protection, disqualifying a service provider from 
protection if it is "aware of facts or circumstances from which in-
fringing activity is apparent."3 Courts and commentators refer to 
this level of awareness as "red flag" knowledge. 4 If the service 
provider obtains red flag knowledge of infringing activity, it must 
act "expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material," 
or be subject to liability.5 As the DMCA currently stands, the red 
flag knowledge provision constricts safe harbor protection to the 
point where online service providers are being held liable when 
they have actively attempted to comply with the statute. Because 
compliance with the law in its current form is so difficult, the 
open accessibility of video-sharing websites is in jeopardy. 
1. s. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
3. Id. § 512(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
4. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (defin-
ing "red flag" knowledge). 
5. § 512(c)(l)(A)(iii). 
643 
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Since the DMCA was enacted, "certain common activities of 
service providers" have evolved with the rising popularity of vid-
eo-sharing websites, such as YouTube and Vimeo.6 Large scale 
copyright infringement is active on these websites, and the music 
industry continues to take action. 7 In the past, record labels have 
successfully sued peer-to-peer networks such as Napster for copy-
right infringement in an effort to fight the effect that the digitiza-
tion of music has had on the industry's revenue.8 In recent years, 
record labels have sued video-sharing websites for vicarious and 
contributory copyright infringement, and, in many instances, for 
storing users' original content that only features copyrighted mu-
sic as the soundtrack.9 Record companies argue that these service 
providers must be disqualified from safe harbor protection be-
cause they have red flag knowledge of infringement in these vide-
os.10 
Video-sharing websites are asserting their safe harbor protec-
tion by demonstrating that they lacked awareness of facts or cir-
cumstances suggesting infringing activity in these videos. 11 Ser-
vice providers have had trouble asserting this defense when there 
is evidence that their employees have watched a specific infring-
ing video that contains a popular song, causing courts to deter-
mine that by watching a video that contains a popular song, the 
service provider has obtained red flag knowledge because it is 
clear that the user who uploaded the video has infringed. 12 This 
determination by the courts makes compliance difficult because it 
is hard for service providers to determine if "infringing activity is 
6. s. REP. No. 105-190, at 19. 
7. See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 33 ("The class plaintiffs similarly claim that Credit 
Suisse, acting as financial advisor to Google, estimated that more than 60% of YouTube's 
content was 'premium' copyrighted content-and that only 10% of the premium content 
was authorized."). 
8. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919--
21 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (involv-
ing suits brought against peer-to-peer networks). 
9. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 
(9th Cir. 2013); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (involving suits brought against video-sharing websites). "Original content" is con-
tent created entirely by the user. 
10. See§ 512(c)(l)(A)(ii); Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
11. See, e.g., Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 542-43 ("[T]hey argue ... the in-
fringing nature of the videos was not 'objectively obvious to a reasonable person,' as ... 
required to support a finding of red flag knowledge.") (internal quotations omitted). 
12. See, e.g., id. at 549. 
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apparent" when they only watch the video. A video could very 
easily be fair use, which is a defense to copyright infringement 
that cannot be easily determined by simply viewing the video.13 
The current state of the DMCA makes compliance very difficult 
in this situation. To ease compliance with the DMCA, Congress 
needs to enact legislation which declares that awareness of mate-
rial that contains any original content, even if the material also 
contains what appears to be the use of another's copyright, does 
not amount to "aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent."14 This expansion of the DMCA 
safe harbors would better protect service providers who are cur-
rently attempting to comply with the statute, but are finding it 
incredibly difficult to manage. Both Y ouTube and Vimeo condemn 
copyright infringement, and Vimeo in particular has actively at-
tempted to deter copyright infringement on its own accord; how-
ever, Vimeo has still found itself potentially liable because the 
narrow DMCA safe harbors make compliance a very difficult 
task. 15 
This comment considers recent cases interpreting the DMCA 
and urges Congress to expand the protection of service providers 
through the DMCA safe harbors. The comment proceeds in six 
parts. Part I explains contributory and vicarious liability, the ap-
plicable sections of the DMCA to this comment, and the fair use 
doctrine. Part II provides a brief overview of video-sharing web-
sites. It further observes the impact that video-sharing websites 
have had on digital media, focusing on the impact on the music 
industry. Part III looks at the recent cases interpreting the 
DMCA's red flag exception to safe harbor protection, as well as a 
case that demonstrates some ramifications of over-enforcement 
by copyright holders. Part IV examines the problem with the cur-
rent interpretation of the red flag provision that leads to service 
providers' greater exposure to liability. Part V argues that Con-
gress needs to enact legislation declaring that awareness of mate-
13. See § 107 ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduc-
tion in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research, is not 
an infringement of copyright."); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 57-58 (1998) (dis-
cussing the nonobviousness of fair use and other copyright infringement defenses with re-
gard to photographs); infra Part LC. 
14. § 512(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
15. See infra Parts II.A, IIl.B. 
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rial that contains any original content, even if the material also 
contains what appears to be the use of another's copyright, does 
not amount to "aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent."16 Finally, this comment concludes 
by explaining how this revision will affect service providers and 
copyright owners, and why this change is necessary. 
I. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
AND THE PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE 
A Secondary Liability 
In order to receive copyright protection, the author's work must 
meet two threshold requirements: originality and fixation. 17 These 
threshold requirements are set out in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), which 
states: "Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "18 Once 
these two requirements are met, copyright protection secures ex-
clusive rights in the work for the copyright owner. 19 These rights 
include the right to reproduction, preparation of derivative works, 
distribution to the public, public performance, and public dis-
play.20 When someone violates one of these exclusive rights, that 
16. § 512(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
17. See id. § 102(a). 
18. Id. (emphasis added). 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was in-
dependently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), 
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, 
the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they pos-
sess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might 
be. 
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citations omit-
ted). If the work is original, it receives protection once it is fixed. See § 102(a). A 
work is "fixed ... when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the 
authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration." See id. § 101 (defining "fixed"). 
19. § 102(a); see id. § 106. Exclusive rights are not secured if the work falls under one 
of the categories listed in § 102(b), which copyright law has specifically excluded from pro-
tection. Id. § 102(b). 
20. § 106. 
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person has directly infringed the author's copyright. 21 In order to 
prove direct infringement, the author must demonstrate that: (1) 
the author owned the copyright in the allegedly infringing mate-
rial and that (2) the alleged infringer violated one of the § 106 
rights granted to the copyright holder or author.22 
However, sometimes there are multiple entities involved in in-
fringement. Frequently, a separate entity provides to the direct 
infringer the device or ability to copy the work, and it is difficult 
for the author to enforce his rights in the protected work against 
the direct infringer.23 The author of the infringed copyright can 
sue the entity that provides the means to infringe under the doc-
trine of secondary liability.24 Secondary liability is split into two 
doctrines: contributory infringement and vicarious infringement.25 
When an entity intentionally induces or encourages direct in-
fringement, that entity can be held liable for contributory in-
fringement.26 However, this doctrine is limited. Whenever a prod-
uct that induces direct infringement is capable of a substantial 
noninfringing use, the distributor of that product cannot be held 
contributorily liable for a third party's infringing use of that 
product unless the distributor's object is promoting the product's 
use to infringe the copyright.21 When an entity profits from the di-
rect infringement of another and has the ability to control the di-
rect infringer's activity, that entity can be held liable for vicarious 
infringement.28 The theory of vicarious liability was developed out 
of the agency principle of respondeat superior-that an employer 
21. Id. § 501(a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner as provided by sectionO 106 ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the au-
thor, as the case may be."); see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 
(9th Cir. 2007) (using the term "direct infringement"). 
22. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1159 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
23. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 
(2005). 
24. See id. at 930. 
25. See id. ("Although the Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for 
infringement committed by another, these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from 
common law principles and are well established in the law.") (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 936-37; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
456 (1984). 
28. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 
262 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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can be held liable for the actions of its employee.29 Nevertheless, 
in copyright law, vicarious liability extends beyond the employer-
employee relationship if the defendant directly profits from the 
direct infringement and has the right and ability to control the 
direct infringer's activity. 30 
B. The DMCA Safe Harbors 
In 1998 Congress recognized that with the growth of the Inter-
net, Internet service providers had become subject to copyright 
infringement liability, with several cases approaching the issue 
from the standpoint of contributory and vicarious infringement.31 
Instead of statutorily altering the existing copyright laws, Con-
gress created "safe harbors" for Internet service providers in or-
der to protect those providers from liability when users of their 
service directly infringed copyrighted material.32 Congress accom-
plished this through Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512.33 In the bill's legislative history, 
Congress noted that 
Copyright laws have struggled through the years to keep pace with 
emerging technology from the struggle over music played on a player 
piano roll in the 1900's [sic] to the introduction of the VCR in the 
1980's [sic]. With this constant evolution in technology, the law must 
adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to disseminate 
and exploit copyrighted materials.34 
With the passing of the DMCA in 1998, Congress provided protec-
tion against copyright liability for Internet service providers to 
make them "safe places to disseminate" copyrighted materials. 35 
The DMCA defines "service provider" as "a provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor."36 
29. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262. 
30. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations 
omitted). 
31. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 2; see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 
1998: COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 8 (1998) (''Title II of the DMCA adds a new section 512 
to the Copyright Act to create four new limitations on liability for copyright infringement 
by online service providers."). 
34. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2. 
35. Id. 
36. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(l)(B) (2012). 
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This definition is broad, and courts have interpreted "service pro-
vider" to cover a wide variety of online platforms, including, but 
not limited to, peer-to-peer networks, drop-boxes, video-service 
providers, MP3 sharing websites, and BitTorrent sites. 37 
The DMCA provides "safe harbors" for service providers.38 In 
particular, § 512(c) provides that "[a] service provider shall not be 
liable ... for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at 
the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or 
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider," 
subject to certain exceptions. 39 One of these exceptions is a 
knowledge exception, which requires that the service provider not 
have actual knowledge that there is infringing material on its 
network in order to qualify for safe harbor protection.40 The other 
exception that greatly reduces the safe harbor protection imputes 
knowledge in the absence of actual knowledge. The statute im-
putes knowledge if the service provider is "aware of facts or cir-
cumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."41 The 
common name for this type of knowledge is "red flag'' knowledge.42 
Copyright owners may also issue a takedown notice to service 
providers, notifying them of infringing material on their net-
work. 43 If the service provider obtains actual knowledge, "red flag 
knowledge," or notification of infringing material, it must act "ex-
peditiously'' to remove the material or disable access to it.44 
The DMCA also includes a provision under § 512(m) ensuring 
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to condition the ap-
plicability of [the safe harbors] on ... a service provider monitor-
ing its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing 
activity .... "45 If service providers had to seek out infringing ac-
tivity in order to maintain protection, there would be no point in 
37. See Edward McCoyd, Internet Piracy Developments: Recent Case Law, Voluntary 
Collaborative Solutions, and Proposals for Additional Remedies, 25 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENT., 
ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 43, 43-46 (2014). 
38. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (using the term "safe harbors" to define the protections 
offered by the DMCA). 
39. § 512(c)(l). 
40. Id. § 512(c)(l)(A)(i). 
41. Id. § 512(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
42. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 44. 
43. See § 512(c)(3). 
44. See id. §§ 512(c)(l)(A)(iii), (c)(l)(C). 
45. Id. § 512(m). 
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the existence of the DMCA safe harbors, because service provid-
ers would already be forced to remove the content that the safe 
harbors were designed to absolve liability. With courts imple-
menting common law doctrine, this provision is an important pro-
tection for service providers. 46 
Another important provision in the DMCA that enhances pro-
tection for service providers is § 512(£), which states: 
Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this sec-
tion ... that material or activity is infringing ... shall be liable for 
damages ... incurred by the alleged infringer ... who is injured by 
such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying 
upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the 
material or activity claimed to be infringing .... 47 
Section 512(f) gives the user of a service provider a cause of ac-
tion against a copyright owner who knowingly and falsely claims 
that the user has infringed on the owner's copyright in order to 
have the service provider remove the user's work. 48 This helps 
keep copyright owners honest by exposing them to liability if they 
demand service providers to remove works that are not infring-
ing. 49 
C. Fair Use 
The fair use doctrine permits one to use another's copyrighted 
work without the copyright owner's consent if certain conditions 
are satisfied.5° Fair use allows authors to develop new ideas that 
build on earlier ones, avoiding rigid application of the copyright 
statute when these new works borrow from earlier works.51 The 
fair use doctrine developed out of the awareness that "there are, 
46. See Viacom Int'!, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Section 
512(m) is explicit: DMCA safe harbor protection cannot be conditioned on affirmative mon-
itoring by a service provider. For that reason, § 512(m) is incompatible with a broad com-
mon law duty to monitor or otherwise seek out infringing activity based on general aware-
ness that infringement may be occurring .... Because the statute does not speak directly 
to the willful blindness doctrine, § 512(m) limits-but does not abrogate-the doctrine." 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
47. § 512(f). 
48. See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 WL 271673, 
at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013). 
49. See, e.g., id. 
50. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007). 
51. See id. 
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and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are 
strictly new and original throughout."52 
Congress eventually codified the fair use doctrine at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107, essentially adopting Justice Joseph Story's interpretation 
of the doctrine. 53 According to Justice Story, to determine fair use, 
one must "'look to the nature and objects of the selections made, 
the quantity and vaiue of the materials used, and the degree in 
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work."'54 Under the codifica-
tion of fair use in 17 U.S.C. § 107, the nonexclusive factors to be 
considered in determining if a work is fair use are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiali-
ty of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 55 
However, the codification of fair use was not intended to rigidify 
the doctrine. 56 Application of the doctrine is very flexible and is 
determined on a case-by-case basis. 57 This flexibility is good for 
defendants because the doctrine can cover many different situa-
tions. Howwever, this flexibility can cause problems for a defend-
ant who will not know whether a judge will later rule that his 
work does not constitute fair use, in the event of an infringement 
suit. 58 The unpredictability of fair use makes it difficult to rely on 
from an ex ante perspective in deciding whether one should obtain 
a license or whether a service provider should remove a work 
from its website. It is not until after the plaintiff in a copyright 
suit proves the elements of infringement that the defendant may 
52. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Emerson v. 
Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)). 
53. Id. at 576. 
54. Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)). 
55. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2012). 
56. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 ("[Fair use] is not to be simplified with bright-line 
rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.") (cit-
ing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). 
57. See id. 
58. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
("[Fair use] is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition."). 
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attempt to avoid liability by arguing that its use of the copyright-
ed work falls within the fair use doctrine. 59 
II. VIDEO-SHARING WEBSITES AND THEIR IMPACT 
A. How Video-Sharing Websites Function 
In February 2005, Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim 
launched YouTube, one of the most popular websites on the In-
ternet today.60 Although it was not the first video-sharing web-
site,61 YouTube's easy-to-use uploading platform caused its popu-
larity to rise at an astounding rate. 62 Since the launch of 
YouTube, other video-sharing websites such as Vimeo have also 
become widely successful.63 
Today, in order for users to post a video on a video-sharing 
website, a user simply has to create an account, free of charge, 
and then upload whatever video the user chooses. With YouTube, 
this is as simple as dragging and dropping the video on the page 
with the user's mouse.64 
Video-sharing websites allow anyone with a camera and a 
computer to video-record a segment and upload it for the world to 
see. Users can create their own videos entirely from scratch or 
they can compile their own content with copyrighted works. Be-
cause the service provider does not screen videos at the upload 
stage, users also have the ability to upload movies, music videos, 
television shows, sports broadcasts, and any other type of copy-
righted material, even though video-sharing websites frown upon 
this type of behavior.65 Once the user uploads the video, anyone 
59. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). 
60. Laura Fitzpatrick, Brief History of YouTube, TIME (May 31, 2010), http://content. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 1990787 ,00.html, [http://perma.cc/QNZ4-HM2W]. 
61. See Andy Plesser, First Video Sharing Site Paved the Way for YouTube-
ShareYourWorld.com Was There First to Launch Ten Years Back, BEET.TV (July 7, 2007, 
1:50 PM), http://www.beet.tv/2007/07/first-video-sha.html, [http://perma.cc/7KPP-N8B9]. 
62. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 60. 
63. See Top 15 Most Popular Video Websites, EBrzMBA, (Sept. 18, 2014), http://ebiz 
mba.com/articles/video-websites, [http://perma.cc/6THX-QJMH]. 
64. See Upload, YouTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/upload, [http://perma.cc/EY8G-C9 
FU] [hereinafter YouTube Upload] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
65. See, e.g., id.; see also Amir Efrati, Reappearing on YouTube: fllegal Movie Uploads, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2013, 5:04 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424 
127887324906004578290321884631206, [http://perma.cc/A349-KJVJ]. YouTube has re-
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with access to the video-sharing website can watch it.66 One im-
portant aspect of video-sharing websites such as YouTube and 
Vimeo is that even though the videos are available to all, most 
cannot be downloaded or copied for further distribution. 67 The on-
ly access users have to most videos is to watch them at the specif-
ic URL address that the video-sharing website assigns to each 
video. 
When uploading a video to YouTube, YouTube provides a mes-
sage that states: "By submitting your videos to YouTube, you 
acknowledge that you agree to YouTube's Terms of Service and 
Community Guidelines. Please be sure not to violate others' copy-
right or privacy rights."68 Moreover, Vimeo provides a message 
which is more demanding, requiring actual creation of the video 
and not just permission, stating: 
"Please follow these rules: 
1. Upload only videos you created yourself. 
2. Certain types of content are not allowed on Vimeo. 
3. Commercial and business videos can only be uploaded with 
Vimeo PR0."69 
Both websites allow the user to click a link that takes them to 
the full terms of service. 10 Even though these sites display their 
terms of service and warnings against copyright infringement, 
the uploading of these videos is instantaneous, not allowing any 
time for an initial screen by the service provider to determine the 
cently implemented an automatic screening process that scans for recognizable music and 
can prevent the user from uploading the video. See Paul Tassi, The Injustice of the 
YouTube Content ID Crackdown Reveals Google's Dark Side, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 10:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sitesfinsertcoin/2013/12119/the-injustice-of-the-youtube-conte 
nt-id-crackdown-reveals-googles-dark-side/, [http://perma.cc!EFK3-JYVV]. 
66. As long as the user does not set the privacy mode of the video to "Private," which 
restricts access to only certain users designated by the uploader. See Video Privacy Set-
tings, YOUTUBE, https:/fsupport.google.com/youtube/answerfl57177?hl=en, [http:f/perma. 
cc/HQP5-4QMR] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
67. See, e.g., Download YouTube Videos, YouTUBE, https:f/support.google.comfyoutube 
fanswer/56100?hl=en, [http://perma.cc/D9P4-75F8] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) ("In gen-
eral, downloading videos that other people have posted on YouTube is not allowed."). Some 
Video-sharing websites do provide an option to allow other users to download the video 
file, however it is not standard and is uncommon. 
68. YouTube Upload, supra note 64. 
69. Upload Your Video, VIMEO, http:/fwww.vimeo.com/upload, [http:ffperma.ccfGCV9-
TYTH] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (emphasis added). 
70. See id.; YouTube Upload, supra note 64. 
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user's compliance.71 By agreeing to the Terms of Service, users 
agree that they are not infringing any copyrights and that the 
service provider reserves the right to remove videos without prior 
notice.72 Both YouTube and Vimeo also provide pages containing 
information on the copyright infringement notification process for 
copyright owners who wish to have any infringing works removed 
from the service providers' websites.73 
B. The Impact of Video Service Providers 
The widespread availability of content on video-sharing web-
sites and the ease of uploading and searching capabilities have 
led to users disseminating video content on a massive scale. 74 
Many YouTube users have gained fame and fortune by generat-
ing millions of hits on their videos. 75 Some users have enough 
viewers that they maintain a steady income by consistently up-
loading videos to their channel, gaining money through adver-
tisement revenue. 76 Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, recognized 
71. YouTube has developed technology to recognize some popular songs. However, in 
many videos, such as videos constituting fair use, the section of the song used may not be 
long or the song may not be detectable by the software. See How Content ID Works, 
YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en&ref_topic=2778544, 
[http://perma.cc/Z74W-ZF83] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
72. See, e.g., Terms of Service, YouTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/tl 
terms, [http://perma.ccNEB-6PMD] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) ("You [(the user)] further 
agree that Content you submit to the Service will not contain third party copyrighted ma· 
terial, or material that is subject to other third party proprietary rights, unless you have 
permission from the rightful owner of the material or you are otherwise legally entitled to 
post the material and to grant YouTube all of the license rights granted herein .... 
YouTube reserves the right to remove Content without prior notice."). 
73. See Vimeo DMCA (Copyright) Notifications and Counter-Notifications Process, 
VIMEO, http://www.vimeo.com/dmca, [http://perma.cc/JR99-H2KL] (last visited Nov. 24, 
2014); Submit a Copyright Takedown Notice, YouTUBE, https://support.google.com/you 
tube/answer/2807622?hl=en, [http://perma.cc/Q4A4-X7J7] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
74. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) ("By March 
2010 ... site traffic on YouTube had soared to more than 1 billion daily video views, with 
more than 24 hours of new video uploaded to the site every minute."). 
75. Julie Lamb, Fame and Fortune: The Power of You Tube, SOCIAL MEDIA DELIVERED 
(Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.socialmediadelivered.com/2012/0l/03/fame-and-fortune-the· 
power-of-youtube-2/, [http://perma.cc/XFA5-KPLF] ("What do Justin Bieber, Colbie Caillat, 
Soulja Boy, and Sean Kingston all have in common? Aside from being celebrities/singers, 
they all started out simply by posting amateur videos of themselves on the Internet, and 
after developing a large following online, were fortunate enough to 'get discovered' by im-
portant people in the music industry."). 
76. See Henry Hanks, YouTubers' 'Please Subscribe' Can Earn Them Fame, Money, 
CNN (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/21/showbiz/youtube-famous· 
american-journey-irptl, [http://perma.cc/URH4-XUDC] ("That living is made through 
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YouTube's effect on broadcast media, stating that '"[n]ot only has 
YouTube created the largest online video community in the world, 
it's shaping the way video is produced, distributed, and mone-
tized."'77 Although not as popular as YouTube, Vimeo distin-
guishes itself with its emphasis on personal creativity. 78 On 
Vimeo's "Community Guidelines" page, Vimeo asks that the user 
only upload videos created by the user, specifically stating that 
the excuse, '"[s]o-and-so gave me permission' does not mean you 
created it."79 
Even though these video-sharing websites pride themselves on 
promoting original content, users can still easily get away with 
posting infringing material. With the vast amount of content 
available and the instantaneous uploading capabilities provided 
by video-sharing websites, copyright infringement is inevitable 
and difficult to police.80 Such copyright infringement has hurt the 
music industry, and the music industry has fought back.81 
Record labels have a history of suing online entities and users 
that frustrate the status quo of the music distribution business.82 
Google's AdSense program, which allows users to open their YouTube accounts to adver-
tisers, after which Google selects the highest bidder. YouTubers get a cut of the profits. 
Some, according to Socialblade.com, earn millions of dollars a year."). 
77. Danielle Sacks, How YouTube's Global Platform is Redefining the Entertainment 
Business, FAST Co. (Jan. 31, 2011, 10:00 AM), available at http://www.fastcompany.com/ 
1715183/how-youtubes-global-platform-redefining-entertainment-business, [http://perma. 
cc/6YCD-YHLF]. 
78. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
("Vimeo distinguishes itself from other video-sharing sites by requiring users to have cre-
ated, or at least have participated in the creation of, the videos they upload."). 
79. Help Center I Vimeo Guidelines, VIMEO, http://www.vimeo.com/help/guidelines, 
[http://perma.cc/8DB5-CP4F] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
80. Service providers have no statutory duty to monitor for infringing material. See 1 7 
U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012). Rather, copyright owners must sift through the videos themselves 
to locate infringing material. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 
2013 WL 271673, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) ("Universal monitored YouTube regularly 
for unauthorized use of Prince's works .... [Universal] entered the titles of the most popu-
lar Prince songs into the YouTube search field, reviewing each returned video to deter-
mine whether it used one or more of the songs in an unauthorized or infringing manner."). 
81. See Eliot Van Buskirk, Is YouTube Bad for Music?, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2011, 10:41 
AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2011/0 l/is-youtube-bad-for-music/, [http://perma. Cc 
/BZ99-RQ43] ("YouTube's strength as a free music source might be hurting music sub-
scriptions and, by extension, artists by offering users a free place to hear just about any 
song they want-the same core function for which Rhapsody hopes you'll pay $10 a 
month."). 
82. E.g., Courtney Macavinta, Recording Industry Sues Music Start-Up, Cites Black 
Market, CNET NEWS (Dec. 7, 1999, 7:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Recording-industry-
sues-music-start-up,-cites-black-market/2100-1023_3-234092.html, [http://perma.cc/L9CM-
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Some of the more infamous cases include the successful copyright 
infringement claims against peer-to-peer networks such as Nap-
ster.83 Record labels even went as far as suing individual users of 
these programs in order to set an example for other peer-to-peer 
network users.84 With the rise in video-sharing websites, a new 
threat to the music industry arose, and the lawsuits followed. 85 
Like peer-to-peer networks, video-sharing websites have been in-
volved in facilitating the infringement of copyrighted music by 
displaying music videos and user-created videos that feature cop-
yrighted music uploaded by someone other than the copyright 
owner.86 In some ways, the music industry has found the ability to 
work with video-sharing websites, particularly in dealing with 
the infringement of copyrighted music videos;87 however, music 
existing on video-sharing websites via artists' music videos is only 
a fraction of the music that appears on these sites. Much of the 
music that appears on video-sharing websites is in the form of a 
soundtrack to user-generated content or as music playing in the 
background of a video. This could include a home video with a 
song added as a soundtrack in post-production editing, or a home 
HLR2] ("In a lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in Northern California, the Recording In-
dustry Association of America charges start-up Napster with violating federal and state 
laws through contributory and vicarious copyright infringement .... " (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
83. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001}. 
84. See Levi Pulkkinen, Downloaders Face the Music as Record Industry Sues, 
SEATILE P-I (May 13, 2007, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Download 
ers-face-the-music-as-record-industry-sues-1237270.php, [http://perma.cc/B7WV-KPZM] 
("After big wins against online music-sharing networks, recording industry leaders are 
now turning their copyright infringement fight toward individual residents."). 
85. E.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC 718 F.3d 1006, 1011 
(9th Cir. 2013) ("Although Veoh has implemented various procedures to prevent copyright 
infringement through its system, users of Veoh's service have in the past been able, with-
out UMG's authorization, to download videos containing songs for which UMG owns the 
copyright. UMG responded by filing suit against Veoh for direct and secondary copyright 
infringement."). 
86. See, e.g., Harvard Baseball 2012 Call Me Maybe Cover, YOUTUBE, http://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=eEWVwgDnuzE, [http://perma.cc/YHN2-KWMQ] [hereinafter Harvard 
Baseball] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (featuring the copyrighted music of Carly Rae 
Jepsen). 
87. See Eliot Van Buskirk, Google, Universal to Launch Music Hub Vevo', WIRED 
(Apr. 9, 2009, 12:51 PM}, http://www.wired.com/2009/04/vevo-is-real/, [http://perma.cc/QQ 
92-H983] (explaining how Universal Music Group and Google collaborated to create "Ve-
vo," a video-sharing platform that is embedded in YouTube so that the labels under Uni-
versal's umbrella can receive ad revenue). 
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video with a song playing in the room. This is the type of content 
that has led to contributory copyright infringement litigation over 
the red flag knowledge provision of the DMCA.88 
III. THE MUSIC INDUSTRY'S FIGHT AGAINST VIDEO-SHARING 
WEBSITES 
A Red Flag Knowledge Under Viacom International v. YouTube 
Since the inception of video-sharing websites, copyright in-
fringement has been an issue. A recent landmark case involved 
media conglomerate Viacom International suing YouTube for con-
tributory copyright infringement, resulting in an appeal to the 
Second Circuit.89 Although Viacom sued YouTube over video con-
tent and not music copyrights,90 the decision by the Second Cir-
cuit has been influential for service providers seeking protection 
under the DMCA. 
The opinion in Viacom International v. YouTube has been in-
fluential in interpreting and distinguishing between the two 
knowledge requirements under § 512(c)(l)(A)(i) and § 512(c)(l) 
(A)(ii) of the DMCA. The court distinguished the DMCA's 
knowledge provision from the red flag provision in order to make 
sure that the red flag provision still had teeth and was "not swal-
lowed up by the actual knowledge provision."91 The court in Via-
com interpreted the red flag provision as "turn[ing] on whether 
the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have 
made the specific infringement 'objectively' obvious to a reasona-
ble person."92 The court further emphasized that "[t]he red flag 
provision, because it incorporates an objective standard, is not 
swallowed up by the actual knowledge provision under our con-
struction of the § 512(c) safe harbor."93 The court also noted that 
88. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 542-44 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (involving user-uploaded videos that contained copyrighted music). 
89. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28-30 (2d Cir. 2012). 
90. See id. at 28-29, 32-33. 
91. Id. at 31 (''The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not be-
tween specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objec-
tive standard."). 
92. Id. (emphasis added). 
93. Id. 
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the actual knowledge and red flag provisions only apply to specif-
ic instances of infringement and not to general awareness of in-
fringing activity. 94 
B. Music Industry Success in Capitol Records v. Vimeo 
In December 2009, Capitol Records filed suit against Vimeo, 
asserting claims for contributory and vicarious copyright in-
fringement,95 for hosting videos that contained music to which 
Capitol Records owned the copyrights.96 In an order from Septem-
ber 2013, the court concluded that "a triable issue existed as to 
whether [Vimeo] had satisfied the Safe Harbor elements ... [for a 
set of videos] with which Vimeo's employees had interacted, be-
cause the Safe Harbor requires that service providers not be 
'aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent."'97 The videos involved in this litigation were not music 
videos; these videos consisted of original video content with copy-
righted music being played as the soundtrack or in the back-
ground.98 
Because the videos involved in the litigation had "some original 
elements," Vimeo asserted in a motion for reconsideration in De-
cember 2013 that, assuming their employees watched the particu-
lar videos, evidence of that alone was not enough to impute red 
flag knowledge on Vimeo in order to hold them liable.99 Following 
the interpretation that red flag knowledge "turns on whether the 
provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made 
the specific infringement 'objectively' obvious to a reasonable per-
son,"100 Vimeo argued that the infringing nature of these videos 
was "not 'obvious' because each video contain[ed] some original 
elements and their creators thus [had] at least a colorable defense 
that they made 'fair use' of the copyrighted material."101 Vimeo 
further argued that courts "should not put service providers in 
94. Id. 
95. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 537, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A)(ii) (2012)). 
98. Id. at 545-46. 
99. Id. at 545. 
100. Viacom lnt'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
101. Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 545. 
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the difficult position of having to decide which uses of a copy-
righted work are infringing'' and which are not. 102 
In response to Vimeo's argument, the court found that evidence 
of infringement was not objectively obvious in two of the twenty 
videos at issue, because these two videos played only short clips of 
songs in the middle of the videos. 103 As for the other eighteen vid-
eos, the court found that "a reasonable juror could ... find that 
the infringing activity in each video was 'objectively' obvious to a 
reasonable person."104 The court did not explain the contents of 
each video, but provided several as examples. One example was a 
video that lasted forty-eight seconds, "during the entirety of 
which the song 'Stacy's Mom' by the artist 'Fountains of Wayne' 
plays while the lyrics appear against a blue background."100 An-
other video was titled "Christina Aguilera-Genie in a Bottle," 
featuring a full length, live performance of the artist. 106 The final 
class of videos was what the court described as "lip-dubs," which 
showed individuals performing everyday activities while lip sync-
ing the words to a copyrighted song playing in the background of 
the video. 107 
The court further rebutted Vimeo's argument, claiming that it 
"threatens to collapse the distinction between 'actual' and 'red 
flag' knowledge, rendering the latter superfluous." 108 The court al-
so briefly addressed Vimeo's argument that Vimeo had no way of 
telling whether some of these users had permission to use the 
song. The court stated: 
102. Id. at 546. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (quoting Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31). As for the other eighteen videos, the court 
found that "a reasonable juror could ... find that the infringing activity in each video was 
'objectively obvious to a reasonable person."' Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 547. 
Red flag knowledge, under [Vimeo's] construction of the statute, would seem-
ingly require not only the upload of an unaltered, copyrighted work but also 
some reliable indication that the user did not have permission to upload the 
work, in order to negate potential legal defenses to copyright infringement. 
But such evidence would be practically indistinguishable from proof of actual 
knowledge-that is, that the provider actually or "subjectively" knew of spe-
cific infringement. 
Id. at 54 7-48 (citations omitted). 
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Here, the copyrighted songs were an integral part of the videos: the 
videos played the songs essentially unmodified and in their entirety, 
and the length of the video corresponded to the length of the song. A 
jury could conclude, based on these circumstances, that it would 
have been '"objectively' obvious to a reasonable person" that the in-
dividual users did not have permission to use the well-known songs 
in their videos. 109 
Finally, the court stated: "Even for those videos that contain an 
original visual image set to the unaltered infringing music, for 
purposes of the 'red flag' inquiry, the Court finds no legally signif-
icant difference between the upload of a full-length and unedited 
copyrighted film and the upload of a full-length and unedited 
copyrighted song."110 The court did not elaborate on what types of 
"original visual image[s]" set to infringing music would be "objec-
tively obvious" infringing activity, but rather decided that using a 
whole song, set to any image, is always "objectively obvious" to 
the viewer as infringing. rn Whether the image was of "lyrics ap-
pear[ing] against a blue background" or a compilation of original, 
extravagant user-generated footage did not matter to the court.112 
If the song is full-length, the content will give rise to red flag 
knowledge. 113 
C. The Issue of Fair Use Under Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. 
In the Northern District of California, the case of Lenz u. Uni-
versal Music demonstrates the blowback that the music industry 
can experience when it issues a takedown order for a video fea-
turing some original content. 114 Although not a case between the 
music industry and a video-sharing website, Lenz offers an exam-
ple as to the consequences that a copyright owner may experience 
when it orders a website to remove a video without considering 
the fair use doctrine.115 
109. Id. at 547 (quoting Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31). 
110. Id. at 548 (emphasis added). 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 546. 
113. See id. at 548. 
114. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783·JF, 2013 WL 271673, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012) (outlining the elements of 
notification). 
115. See Lenz, 2013 WL 271673, at *6; see supra Part LC. 
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In Lenz, Stephanie Lenz filmed her young son in her kitchen 
"dancing'' to the song "Let's Go Crazy" by "Prince."116 Lenz then 
uploaded the twenty-nine second video to YouTube, naming the 
video "Let's Go Crazy #1."111 Universal Music, the administrator 
of Prince's copyrights, monitored YouTube for unauthorized use 
of Prince's works and flagged the video for a removal list. 118 Uni-
versal then sent this removal list to YouTube, which removed the 
video and notified Lenz of the removal. 119 Lenz then sent You Tube 
a counter-notice, asserting that the video constituted fair use of 
"Let's Go Crazy."120 Lenz then filed a complaint against Universal 
asserting misrepresentation pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 121 
Early in the litigation, the court determined that a copyright 
owner must consider fair use before proceeding with a takedown 
notice under the DMCA, or else the notification may lead to liabil-
ity for misrepresentation under § 512(f). 122 Later in the litigation, 
the court determined that "a copyright owner must make at least 
an initial assessment as to whether the fair use doctrine applies 
to the use in question in order to make a good faith representa-
tion that the use is not 'authorized by law."' 123 Such an assess-
ment "must include at least some analysis of the legal import of 
the facts" because the question as to whether something consti-
tutes fair use is a "legal judgment."124 
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION 
OF THE RED FLAG PROVISION 
With the courts' current interpretation of the red flag provi-
sion, safe harbor protection is diminishing for video-sharing web-
116. Lenz, 2013 WL 271673, at *1. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at *2; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(£) (2012) ("Any person who knowingly materially 
misrepresents under this section ... that material or activity is infringing ... shall be lia-
ble for any damages .... "). 
122. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154-55 (N.D. Cal 2008) 
("An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice 
without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepre-
sentation claim pursuant to Section 512(£) of the DMCA."). 
123. Lenz, 2013 WL 271673, at *6. 
124. Id. (quoting Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1183 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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sites when agents of those websites view videos that present evi-
dence of possible copyright infringement. Employees of websites 
like YouTube or Vimeo will inevitably come in contact with videos 
that infringe on some level, and in most litigation, these websites 
do not contest employee interaction with the videos in the suit. 125 
However, just because someone has watched a video does not 
mean that he has gained knowledge that the work is infringing, 
nor has he necessarily become aware of facts that indicate that 
the work is infringing. 126 
If a potentially infringing video features some creative original 
content, 127 video-sharing websites are forced to remove it to avoid 
liability because they do not know if the video will hold up under 
a fair use defense until a judge determines so in the event of liti-
gation. Now, under Capitol Records, the judge will most likely not 
determine that the video is fair use. 128 Such an example would in-
clude a YouTube employee coming across the once-viral video 
created by members of the Harvard Baseball Team, who danced 
in their road-van to Carly Rae Jepsen's popular song "Call Me 
Maybe."129 The audio of the video features the full length copy-
righted song playing over the car radio, but the image solely con-
sists of original content (video of the baseball team dancing), 
which in combination with other factors, leads to a colorable ar-
gument of fair use for the video. 130 If there was evidence of a 
YouTube employee having watched the video, the employee could 
125. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 542, 545 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (involving videos that both parties agreed or assumed were watched by 
Vimeo employees). 
126. See id. at 545; see also § 512(c)(l)(A). 
127. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346, 351 (1991) 
("[O]riginality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity .... As we have 
explained, originality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for copyright protec-
tion."). 
128. See, e.g., Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 545-48. 
129. See Harvard Baseball, supra note 86. 
130. See id. This video provides a good example because a fair use analysis considering 
the four statutory factors under 17 U.S.C. § 107 could yield a determination in either di-
rection. The "purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature ... " is a factor that could lean either way, as the creation of the video could 
have been just for fun and it is unclear if the uploader is receiving any ad revenue from 
YouTube. § 107(1). The fact that the video used the whole song weighs against a finding of 
fair use. See id. § 107(3). However, the fact that the "effect of the use upon the potential 
market for ... the copyrighted work" could in fact be positive for its promotional charac-
teristics weighs in favor of a finding of fair use. Id. § 107(4). 
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submit the video to his own fair use analysis to determine if the 
video is in fact infringing. However, the indeterminate nature of 
fair use makes the analysis very difficult. 131 If the employee 
thinks the video constitutes fair use and therefore does not re-
move the video, but a judge disagrees when the record label sues 
YouTube for not removing it, YouTube would be liable. This is the 
state of the law under Viacom International and Capitol Records, 
where YouTube must remove that video to avoid liability when 
there is a good probability it is legal under the fair use doctrine. 132 
Many videos that consist of the fair use of popular media enrich 
the culture and inspire new works, yet when those videos are 
screened, they are likely to never be available to the public eye 
again. 133 
If the copyright owner does its own fair use analysis "in order 
to make a good faith representation that the use is not 'author-
ized by law"' under Lenz, 134 and proceeds to send a takedown no-
tice to YouTube, then YouTube will have to remove the video to 
avoid liability under § 512(c)(l)(C). 136 However, the video creator 
can issue a counter-notice claiming fair use, creating an oppor-
tunity to get the video back up on the website. 136 Yet if YouTube 
takes the video down to avoid liability due to its belief that it has 
attained red flag knowledge under Viacom International and 
Capitol Records, the video creator has no avenue to restore the 
video, because YouTube reserves the right to take down any video 
131. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) ("[Fair use] is not 
to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls 
for case-by·case analysis.") (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). 
132. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
133. For example, the Harvard Baseball video caught national attention, receiving over 
seventeen million views and inspiring other users to submit their own works. E.g., 
WATCH: Harvard Baseball Guys Take On Carly Rae Jepson's 'Call Me Maybe', 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/ 
harvard-baseball- call-me-maybe_n_1504147.html, [http://perma.cc/G2SA-YN55] (referenc-
ing a prior cover by University of Florida students as well); SMU Women's Rowing 2012 
Call Me Maybe Cover, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7ppxF40130, [http: 
//perma.cc/5Q8H-XU 3H] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
134. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 WL 271673, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013). 
135. See § 512(c)(l)(C) (declaring a service provider not liable if, upon notification of 
infringement, it acts expeditiously to remove the infringing material). 
136. Id. § 512(g) (explaining that a user can issue a counter notification to have his ma-
terial replaced after it has been removed). 
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that it wants on its own network under the Terms of Service.137 
Therefore, a video-sharing website that removes a video to avoid 
liability under the belief that it may have attained red flag 
knowledge does greater damage to users than removal via a for-
mal takedown notice from the copyright owner, because the user 
has no realistic avenue to get the video restored after removal. 
The video-service provider has no duty to restore the video and 
will most likely not do so in order to avoid liability. 138 
v. How TO RESOLVE THE CURRENT RED FLAG PROVISION ISSUES 
In order to keep the DMCA protecting the progression of the 
arts, 139 Congress needs to add a provision which declares: Aware-
ness of material that contains any original content, even if the 
material also contains what appears to be the use of another's 
copyright, does not amount to red flag knowledge of infringe-
ment.140 Whether the use of another's copyright is unlicensed or 
amounts to fair use would not matter, as originality would be the 
key factor for this determination. The analysis to determine 
whether the content has sufficient originality should be the same 
as the threshold requirement for copyright protection under 1 7 
U.S.C. § 102(a). 141 This change in the DMCA would resolve many 
of the issues that courts have had to deal with, leading to less 
confusion, less litigation, and the preservation of the easily acces-
sible publishing capabilities that video-sharing websites provide. 
The main issue that this revision to the statute would elimi-
nate is the difficult determination of whether viewing a certain 
video that can "conceivably be justified by a colorable claim of li-
cense or fair use"142 makes "the provider ... subjectively aware of 
137. See Terms of Service, supra note 72 ("YouTube reserves the right to remove Con-
tent without prior notice."). 
138. See id. 
139. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (indicating that promoting and protecting 
creativity is a goal of the DMCA). 
140. See§ 512(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
141. See id. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "); see also 
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340 (1991) ("Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of 
the Constitution mandates originality as a prerequisite for copyright protection. The con-
stitutional requirement necessitates independent creation plus a modicum of creativity."). 
142. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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facts that would have made the specific infringement 'objectively' 
obvious to a reasonable person."143 Determining what constitutes 
red flag knowledge of a video's infringing nature when the video 
also contains original content involves judicial decision-making 
on whether a video's infringing characteristics are "objectively 
obvious"-a process that shares the flexibility of the fair use 
analysis, making compliance next to impossible. 144 By changing 
the law to designate any video containing original content to not 
be considered evidence of red flag knowledge, the court will no 
longer have to determine which infringing activity is "objectively 
obvious" with regard to any works that could conceivably be fair 
use. 
Determining what is "objectively obvious" infringement be-
comes even more difficult when the person responsible for making 
the determination is an employee of a video-sharing website who 
is not an attorney, is not necessarily educated in copyright law, or 
is not aware that he has a duty to take action. Even if an employ-
ee is educated in copyright law, such an analysis will still not 
likely lead to a conclusive answer, because it is difficult to know if 
a judge will agree with the employee's determination in the event 
of a lawsuit, mirroring the problems of determining fair use on an 
ex ante basis. 
If video-sharing websites remove videos with original content 
only when the copyright owner issues a takedown notice, a video 
143. Viacom lnt'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
144. See Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 546. The court in Capitol Records re-
viewed twenty videos in the suit to determine if when an employee viewed these videos he 
"was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement 'objective-
ly' obvious to a reasonable person." Id. (quoting Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31). In doing so, the 
court essentially engaged in a fair use analysis to determine that two of the videos did not 
contain facts that would make infringement objectively obvious, because in these videos 
"the copyrighted songs play for only a short time in the background (approximately 38 and 
57 seconds, respectively) during the middle of the video and are otherwise a less signifi-
cant aspect of the videos." Id. However, doing the same analysis for the other eighteen 
videos, the court determined that evidence of infringement could be objectively obvious. Id. 
The court does not state that it is determining which videos constitute fair use; however, 
that is essentially the analysis in which the court engages. This is ironic because the court 
later refutes Vimeo's argument that employees cannot have red flag knowledge when a 
video constitutes a colorable argument for fair use. See id. at 547. The court essentially 
emphasizes the problem: that the judge is the only one who has a say on fair use; so if 
someone else thinks a work may be fair use, they had better be right when it comes to trial 
or they will be liable. 
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creator has a greater chance of having his video replaced if he can 
argue fair use. Under the proposed change in the statute, if avid-
eo has at least some original content and the copyright owner ob-
jects to the video's presence, the copyright owner must order the 
takedown of the video himself if he wants it removed. 146 Under 
Lenz, "a copyright owner must make at least an initial assess-
ment as to whether the fair use doctrine applies to the use in 
question in order to make a good faith representation that the use 
is not 'authorized by law.'"146 When the copyright owner issues a 
takedown notice, the creator of the video at least has the oppor-
tunity to issue a counter-notice if he believes that he has a de-
fense of fair use. 147 In order to deter over-enforcement, the DMCA 
gives the creator a cause of action against the copyright holder if 
he believes the copyright holder materially misrepresented the 
infringing nature of the work.148 
The court in Capitol Records would argue that this change in 
the statute would cause the red flag knowledge exception to dis-
appear, leaving only the actual knowledge exception. 149 However, 
this change does not eliminate the red flag knowledge exception 
or Viacom's "objectively obvious" standard. 160 The mere fact that a 
work has not been altered (or has barely been altered) does not 
mean that one has actual knowledge that it was infringed. It is, 
however, evidence of apparent infringement, leading to red flag 
knowledge. There are plenty of examples of works that are not 
protected by the proposed change in the law that give evidence of 
red flag knowledge that do not amount to actual knowledge. 
Take, for instance, the video in Capitol Records consisting of the 
Fountains of Wayne song, "Stacy's Mom," with only the lyrics on 
the screen. 151 The person who created this video took the effort to 
put the lyrics on the screen to go with the song, combining his 
own work with the song to create the video, but his own work is 
not original. 162 Since no originality is added to this video by simply 
145. See§ 512(c)(3). 
146. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 WL 271673, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013). 
147. § 512(g). 
148. Id. § 512(£). 
149. See Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 547. 
150. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
151. See Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
152. See § 102(a) (explaining that only original works are protected by copyright law); 
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putting the lyrics on screen, it would not be covered by the sug-
gested expansion of the DMCA protection when viewed by a ser-
vice provider. 153 However, just viewing this video without any fur-
ther inquiry does not amount to actual knowledge either, because 
there is no way for the service provider to know that the user cre-
ated this video without permission, or that the copyright owner 
did not upload the video itself. 154 
Record companies may object to this new revision because it 
protects some infringing content from being captured under the 
red flag provision. Nevertheless, if an infringing video is not 
flagged due to this proposed revision, the copyright holder can 
make the effort itself to issue a takedown notice or to go after the 
user who directly infringed if it feels that such an action is worth 
the effort and expense. 155 
CONCLUSION 
Expanding safe harbor coverage by declaring that the aware-
ness of the storage of a potentially infringing work that also fea-
tures original content of any amount does not amount to 
"aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing ac-
tivity is apparent"156 keeps the DMCA protecting the progression 
of the arts, one of the objectives of copyright. 157 The current state 
Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
153. The court in Capitol Records ruled that this video gave rise to red flag knowledge 
and not actual knowledge, and the video would still be considered infringing under this 
comment's proposed revision to the DMCA. See Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 548. 
154. Unless the uploader declared under the video that he did not have permission, 
which some uploaders actually admit. See, e.g., Raising Creativity, How Do You Know 
When a Painting is Finished?, YouTUBE, Sept. 22, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=olgqoxBXAvs, [http://perma.cc/9FUT-H6RS] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). In that case, 
actual knowledge of infringement would exist. 
155. Record companies may object further, noting that some videos feature mostly in-
fringing content and only a miniscule amount of original material, and will escape a find-
ing of infringement under this comment's proposed red flag knowledge provision. Some 
infringing videos with minimal originality will not lead to red flag knowledge under the 
proposed revision, but determining what amount of originality is miniscule enough, among 
other factors, to completely rule out fair use, should not be up to the service provider. See § 
107 (setting forth the statutory factors to consider for fair use). If the copyright owner 
thinks that the video lacks sufficient originality, he can issue a takedown notice or sue the 
user who directly infringed. If the copyright owner doesn't mind the video, the law should 
not impose a duty on the video-sharing website to remove it before there is even a hint of a 
complaint. 
156. Id. § 512(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
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of the law under Viacom and Capitol Records threatens the pro-
gress in digital art distribution that video-sharing websites have 
propelled over the past few years. By providing an open platform 
for video producers to display their works for free to the entire 
world, video-sharing websites achieve one of the goals of copy-
right law on a massive scale: fostering the dissemination of crea-
tivity so that artists can build on the creativity of others. Even 
though some of the works on video-sharing websites consist of 
clear infringement-activity that is harmful for copyright law-
the over-enforcement of infringement actions threatens the abil-
ity of the video-sharing websites to disseminate many artistic 
works. 
Imposing liability on service providers through the red flag 
knowledge provision for a video that is arguably fair use threat-
ens the operations of video-sharing websites, as such sites will 
have to change their methods to avoid liability. These websites 
could have to remove countless videos that feature an abundance 
of user-generated original content and do not compete with the 
copyright owner's work. Once a video becomes popular and an 
employee of the video-sharing website views it, it will not survive 
if it features any copyrighted material. Another potential change, 
to which some websites have already resorted, involves video-
sharing websites screening videos before they are uploaded. 158 
With changes such as these, an artist could not publish any work 
featuring the fair use of another's copyright at the risk of the ser-
vice provider removing the work without a fair use analysis or the 
service provider not publishing the work at all. Fostering fair use 
works is important for progression in the arts because allowing 
artists to interpret and build on established works leads to ad-
vancement and growth without having to start from scratch. 159 
The expansion of the DMCA safe harbors, if already enacted, 
would have protected Vimeo from its battle against Capitol Rec-
ords. Vimeo, a website that takes pride in only allowing users to 
upload videos they have created, has been sued when it has ac-
tively attempted to deter copyright infringement without a statu-
158. YouTube has already implemented some screening devices that can detect the au-
dio of popular songs. How Content ID Works, YouTUBE, http://support.google.com/youtube 
/answer/2797370?hl=en, [http://perma.cc/T2GQ-3NGA] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014); 
YouTube Help, YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=9g2Ul2SsRns#t=39, [http://perma.cc/9QAL-8R7T] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
159. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
2015] DANGER IN THE DMCA SAFE HARBORS 669 
tory demand to do so. 160 This demonstrates that even when a web-
site tries to promote conformity with copyright law, it can find it-
self liable because the current state of the DMCA makes compli-
ance so difficult. 
Hank Fisher * 
160. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. See generally Capitol Records, LLC v. 
Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537 (exemplifying Vimeo's legal battle for copyright in-
fringement despite anti-infringement policies). 
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